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Abstract  
This study examines the determinants of domestic investment in sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries with explicit focus on the role of governance/institutions. The literature has 
emphases more on the macroeconomic factors that explain investment, neglecting the non-
economic causes that could be more important. A panel of 45 selected sub-Saharan African 
countries and the period 1996–2013 were considered in the estimations using the two-stage 
least-squares estimation techniques. The results are in line with the findings of existing 
literature. The study expands on the analysis that governance/institutions play an important 
role in explaining the long-term pattern of domestic investment in the region. In addition, the 
study identify that a sustainable level of domestic investment could be attained at a particular 
governance rating. Therefore, countries with better governance ratings will achieve higher 
investment levels and domestic investment tends to converge as poor governance is attained. 
Keywords: convergence, domestic investment, GDP, governance and institutions, sub-
Saharan Africa 
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1. Introduction and background  
 
Investments in physical capital remain an important macroeconomic variable that is needed to 
create demand and increase the productive capacity of a country. Capital formation serves as 
a linkage between the demand-side and supply-side of the economy, because of its role in 
creating demand and as an important input into the production process. It is regarded as one 
of the major catalysts to achieving inclusive growth and development of any economy, given 
its multifaceted impact on both the economic and social wellbeing of the individual and 
society as a whole. Therefore, if investment is such an important macroeconomic variable, to 
ensure a good performance, a strong and stable institutional (governance structure) 
environment needs to be established (Acemoglu et al, 2004; North, 1990). This study 
investigates the impact of the various elements of governance on domestic investment in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA).   
Empirical literature has identified some macroeconomic variables that are responsible for 
explaining the level of domestic investment in the economy. Many of these studies (i.e. 
Shafik, 1992; Oshikoya, 1994; Ghura & Goodwin, 2000; Ndikumana, 2000; Du Toit & 
Moolman, 2004; Bayraktar & Fofack, 2007) have concentrated on macroeconomic and 
financial variables using the Keynesian, the Tobin’s Q and neoclassical theory of investment 
for a country-specific or panel of countries analysis. These studies found that both financial 
variables (i.e. profitability of firms, cost of capital and mark-up prices) and macroeconomic 
variables (i.e. GDP and rate of openness) are significant determinants of investment. 
However, more recent literature (i.e. De Mendonca & Da Silva Lima, 2011; Foster-
McGregor, 2013; Ucan, 2014) continue to confirm this trend.  
Few studies have emerged with regard to the role played by governance or institutions in 
explaining investment. Mody and Srinivasan (1998), Altomonte (2000) and Bevan and Estrin 
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(2000) have revealed the importance of a country-specific institutional and political 
environment as a determining factor in explaining investment. More relevant for this study, is 
the analyses of Globerman and Shapiro (2002), Anyanwu (2012), Bellos and Subasat (2012), 
Morrissey and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) and Akanbi (2012), who investigated how 
governance affects foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and total aggregate domestic 
investment in developed and developing economies. These studies confirm the significant 
role played by good governance in attracting investment, with the exception of Bellos and 
Subasat (2012), whose results suggest that the lack of good governance does not deter foreign 
direct investment. Most of these studies focused on the aspect of FDI.  
The importance of good governance in the development of a nation remains a crucial debate 
among global policy makers in recent years and this aspect of policy paradigm is seen as the 
major stumbling block to the implementation of many macroeconomic policies in many 
developing and low-income economies (Globerman & Shapiro, 2002). Rodrik et al (2004) 
argue that the quality of institutions triumphs over any other factors that can drive the 
economy. In other words, to achieve any meaningful economic objectives a solid institutional 
framework should be embedded in the system. In their study, the quality of institutions, rather 
than geography and trade integration was found to have a positive and significant effect on 
economic performance.  
Looking at the performance of investment and governance, the evolution of domestic 
investment in SSA countries has revealed some basic trends over the past two decades or two 
in relation to the level of governance. Figure 1 shows the averages of aggregate domestic 
investment and governance across both SSA countries and globally during the period 1996 to 
2013. It also reveals the correlation that exists between investment and governance in SSA 
during the same period.     
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Figure 1: Domestic investment and governance performance in sub-Saharan Africa 
Panel A Panel B 
  
Panel C Panel D 
  
Source: World Bank Databank (2015) and Worldwide Governance Indicator Database (2015)       
 
Average domestic investment in SSA countries remains at a very low level in comparison 
with the global average (figure 1; panel A). In 1996, average domestic investment in SSA 
stood at about $1.5 billion and it has only risen to about $4.7 billion in 2013. Despite the 
steady average increase of about 7 per cent per year, the share of SSA domestic investment in 
global domestic investment remain very low at about 3.5 per cent per year on average. As a 
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share of GDP, SSA’s domestic investment has been on its upward trend since 1999 rising 
from 20 per cent of GDP to about 32 per cent of GDP in 2012 while global trend remain 
subdued and rising only from about 22 per cent of GDP to 23.5 per cent of GDP between 
1996 and 2013 (figure 1; panel B). Given the geopolitical significance of the SSA region in 
the global space, the picture has revealed serious structural impediments embedded in the 
region. These structural impediments are also embedded in the governance structures of SSA 
countries. In panel C of figure 1, it is revealed that the governance index in SSA countries has 
also remained significantly below the global averages. For instance, in 1996, the governance 
index in SSA stood at about -0.66 compared to global index of about -0.02 during the same 
period. Global governance has improved slightly, to 0 since 2004, while the governance 
index in SSA rose to about -0.63.
i
 Comparing governance with domestic investment in SSA, 
panel D in figure 1 shows a very weak positive correlation between the two variables but at 
the same time revealed some important facts about causal effect. South Africa remain the best 
performing (outlier) economy in terms of level of investment ($42.5 billion) and better 
governance rating (0.33).
ii
 Generally, many SSA countries are clustered around low 
investment levels and poor governance ratings, an indication that poor governance will deter 
investment into the region. However, there are countries with better governance ratings (i.e. 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia and Seychelles), but low investment. This can be 
attributed mainly to their small economic size. 
The concept of governance/institutions, as used in this study, follows Kaufmann et al (1999) 
definition and cited in Akanbi (2015). It explains that governance consists of the “traditions 
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This involves the process by 
which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”.    
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This study offers a broader analysis of Akanbi's (2012) findings, which confirms the 
significant role played by governance in explaining domestic investment in Nigeria. In this 
study the important role of good governance on aggregate domestic investment in SSA 
countries is re-emphasized. What distinguishes this study from other related studies are: 
 its ability to detect the impact of governance (using the different elements of 
governance indicators) on domestic investment; and 
 identifying a threshold for sustainable domestic investment level at a particular 
governance rating after controlling for level of real output and other significant 
variables affecting investment within the region. Therefore, the study reveals that 
countries with a particular governance rating can achieve a particular level of 
domestic investment, if they operate at a particular income (GDP) level. It also 
reveals how domestic investment could tend to converge/diverge at lower or upper 
levels of governance ratings. 
The results suggest that the GDP level, level of financial development, cost of capital, 
exchange rate and governance all have a major role to play in boosting domestic investment 
in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to this, domestic investment convergence tends to occur as 
poor governance is ensued, but there exist a divergence in domestic investment when there is 
some political instability in the region.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical framework, 
econometric methodology and the description of the data used in the study; section 3 analyses 
the various estimation results with a further step to identify a sustainable level of domestic 
investment at particular governance ratings; and section 4 concludes the study and also 
provides policy recommendations.  
2. Theoretical framework, methodology and data analysis  
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The theoretical framework behind investment decisions began from the well-established 
capital stock identity in the literature, expressed as follows:  
ttt IKK  1)1(  ,                                                                                                  (1) 
Where tK  and 1tK  are the capital stocks in the current and previous period respectively,   
is the rate of depreciation and tI  is the gross domestic investment. 1tK  is the replacement 
investment and 1 tt KK  is the net investment. Therefore, the following identity holds for 
gross investment:  
)( 11   tttt KKKI                                                                                                (2) 
Equation (2) means that, gross investment is the sum of replacement investment and net 
investment. The methodology adopted in this study follows the neoclassical approach (i.e. 
Jorgenson, 1963) to domestic investment in SSA region. The neoclassical model is built on 
the strict assumption that firms maximise profits in a perfectly competitive environment. 
However, this study considers an augmented neoclassical approach, as adopted by Akanbi 
(2012), to be the most suitable approach in estimating the domestic investment function for 
SSA countries. Therefore, the model incorporates institutional features such as governance as 
part of firms’ optimisation problem when making investment decisions. In line with empirical 
literature, the study explains domestic investment as a function of GDP, financial 
development, real interest rate, nominal exchange rate and the different forms of governance.  
A panel data econometric technique is used to estimate the determinants of domestic 
investment in the selected sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1996–2013. The 
econometric models are presented alongside their a priori sign below: 
ititititititit egovexchrealmgdpI  654321 ln_int2ln_ln_ln_                    
(3) 
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Where domestic investment (I) is measured by the gross fixed capital formation; gdp is the 
level of income (measured by gross domestic product); m2 is the level of financial 
development (measured by M2 money supply); realint is the real interest rate (nominal 
interest rate minus inflation); exch is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per US 
dollar); gov is the governance indexes; and e is the error term. The subscript, it, refers to the 
country and time period, respectively. All variables are presented in their natural logarithm 
forms, except for the governance indexes and real interest rate that have negative values. The 
gov variable is expressed in the different elements of governance indicators such as 
corruption control (cc), political instability (pi), government effectiveness (ge), rule of law 
(rl), regulatory quality (rq), voice and accountability (va) and the average governance 
(gov_ave). The focus of the study is to see the overall and individual effects of each elements 
of governance on domestic investment, after controlling for other possible transmission 
channels as additional explanatory variables in the model. 
The GDP is expected to show a positive relationship with domestic investment, as evidenced 
in the literature. Likewise, the level of financial development should have a positive effect on 
domestic investment. Therefore, an increase in GDP and financial development should lead 
to a further increase in domestic investment. Real interest rate, a measure of cost of capital, is 
expected to pose a negative relationship with domestic investment. Rising real interest rate 
will discourage real investment decisions in the economy. Nominal exchange rate is included 
in the specification, because both domestic and foreign investors are more concerned about 
the absolute cost of making a real investment in an economy rather than relative cost, which 
is captured by the real exchange rate. In addition, the stability of a currency also plays an 
important role in attracting investment. Therefore, a depreciating (increase), exchange rate is 
expected to boost domestic investment irrespective of whether the real investment decisions 
are made locally or is from abroad. For a domestic investor, a depreciating exchange rate 
could encourage more capital formation in the production for more exports, while a foreign 
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investor will take the advantage of a depreciating currency to invest in an economy. With 
regard to governance, a better governance structure is expected to encourage more domestic 
investment into the country. Therefore, governance is expected to pose a positive relationship 
with domestic investment. 
The use of ordinary least squares estimation is found to be inappropriate, since the 
specification of the model reveals a possible endogeneity problem among the regressors. In 
other words, there could be evidence that the explanatory variables in the model could be 
endogenous and correlated with the error term. In this scenario, the appropriate estimation 
technique will be an instrumental variable regression, in order to derive robust estimates of 
the parameters in equations (3). Therefore, a TSLS estimation method is adopted and, in 
order to correct for possible omitted variables and error in variables, suitable instruments are 
used that are assumed to be highly correlated with the observed explanatory variables and 
uncorrelated with the error term (Wooldridge 2010, pp. 89-115). The instruments used are 
one period lagged value of all independent and dependent variables in the model. These 
instruments enter into the below reduced-form equations for the endogenous variables:   
ititititititit ugovexchrealmgdpgdp 1)1()1(ln_)1(int)1(2ln_)1(ln_ln_ 654321    
(4) 
ititititititit ugovexchrealmgdpm 2)1()1(ln_)1(int)1(2ln_)1(ln_2ln_ 654321    
(5) 
ititititititit ugovexchrealmgdpreal 3)1()1(ln_)1(int)1(2ln_)1(ln_int 654321    
(6) 
ititititititit ugovexchrealmgdpexch 4)1()1(ln_)1(int)1(2ln_)1(ln_ln_ 654321    
(7) 
11 
 
ititititititit ugovexchrealmgdpgov 5)1()1(ln_)1(int)1(2ln_)1(ln_ 654321    
(8) 
Where 1u  to 5u  are the error term. However, if 0,,,, 65432   and all other parameters 
in the reduced form equations are not equal to zero, then the structural equation is identified, 
because the instruments are relevant in the equation determining it. Furthermore, country-
specific and time-specific characteristics were considered in the estimations under the 
assumption that, although these countries may have similar economic structures, there still 
exist major differences in their patterns of investment and are exposed to different exogenous 
shock at a particular point in time. Given this, the study carried out the TSLS with two-way 
(cross-section-specific) fixed effect estimation techniques.
iii
 
The data used in this study have been obtained from the World Bank Databank; African 
Development Indicators, International Monetary Fund; International Financial Statistics, and 
Worldwide Governance Indicators database. It covers the period between 1996 and 2013 and 
includes 45 selected sub-Saharan African countries. All data were accessed in 2015, 
measured in real-term (2005 prices) US dollars and expressed in natural logarithms, except 
for variables with negative values. 
As mentioned earlier, the worldwide governance indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (1999) were utilised in this study. The indices cover a wide range of policy 
and institutional outcomes and include the rule of law, corruption control, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, voice and accountability and political instability. These 
indices are also employed in Globerman and Shapiro (2002) and Akanbi (2015) as a measure 
of governance. The governance scores ranges from –2.5 to +2.5, with –2.5 representing the 
worst governance and +2.5 the best governance. Each of the six elements of governance 
mentioned above were used interchangeably in the model and, to capture governance in a 
broader context, the average value of the six elements were taken and used as an additional 
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variable to measure overall governance in the region. The period of investigation of the study 
was limited, as it started from 1996 onward, since the governance indicators’ series is only 
available from that period. However, an interpolation of the series was done given the 
missing values for 1997, 1999 and 2001 that existed in the series.  
3. Empirical analysis 
Based on the framework adopted above, this section presents the estimation results and 
further extends to identifying the sustainable levels of domestic investment when governance 
are at particular ratings. In this analysis, domestic investment tends to converge at lower or 
poor governance ratings.  
3.1. Estimation results 
The estimations carried out confirm that the positive correlation exhibited between domestic 
investment and governance measures have translated into causation. Although, by removing 
the outlier (South Africa) from the panel, the trend in figure 1 changed to a weak negative 
correlation. However, this does not have any effect on the signs and causations in the 
estimation results due to the two-way fixed effect estimation technique adopted. Balanced 
panel estimations were carried out with 765 pooled observations after necessary adjustments 
had been made. After solving all the possible estimation problems (i.e. endogeneity) that 
could render the coefficients invalid, the entire explanatory variables examined in the 
estimations were found to be statistically significant determinants of domestic investment. 
These variables explained significantly well the level of domestic investment within the 
region except for financial development variable which is found to be statistically 
insignificant in almost all the estimations (table 1). This is an indication that the structural 
equation (TSLS) is identified and the instruments adopted are valid.
iv
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Table 1: Estimated coefficients for the determinants of domestic investment  
Independent 
variables 
Estimation 
1 
Estimation 
2 
Estimation 
3 
Estimation 
4 
Estimation 
5 
Estimation 
6 
Estimation 
7 
Real GDP 0.80*** 
(2.96) 
0.50* 
(1.72) 
0.98*** 
(3.91) 
0.81*** 
(3.00) 
0.77** 
(2.74) 
0.88*** 
(3.13) 
0.83*** 
(2.98) 
Financial 
development 
0.18 
(1.32) 
0.20 
(1.53) 
0.10 
(0.75) 
0.14 
(1.01) 
0.16 
(1.19) 
0.19 
(1.35) 
0.23* 
(1.70) 
Real interest 
rate 
-0.01*** 
(-4.70) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.74) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.63) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.68) 
-0.01** 
(-4.65) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.63) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.55) 
Nominal 
exchange rate 
0.33*** 
(3.12) 
0.27** 
(2.55) 
0.31*** 
(3.08) 
0.35*** 
(3.29) 
0.37*** 
(3.38) 
0.36* 
(3.19) 
0.33*** 
(3.03) 
Average 
governance 
0.68*** 
(3.34) 
      
Regulatory 
quality 
 0.98*** 
(3.87) 
     
Voice and 
accountability 
  0.77*** 
(3.98) 
    
Rule of law    0.71*** 
(3.37) 
   
Corruption 
control 
    0.79*** 
(3.37) 
  
Government 
effectiveness 
     0.83*** 
(3.28) 
 
Political 
stability 
      0.33*** 
(2.57) 
Constant -2.05 
(-0.38) 
4.74 
(0.79) 
-4.15 
(-0.84) 
-1.34 
(-0.25) 
-1.22 
(-0.21) 
-3.96 
(-0.71) 
-3.91 
(-0.71) 
Number of 
observations 
765 765 765 765 765 765 765 
R-square 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.78 
Durbin-
Watson 
statistic 
2.34 2.32 2.28 2.34 2.34 2.32 2.27 
Note: ***Significant at 1% level. **Significant at 5% level. *Significant at 10% level. T-statistics are recorded 
in parentheses. 
Source: Author’s calculation and analysis of data from Eviews 8. 
The results show that an increase in average governance (better governance) by an index 
point will translate into about a 0.68% increase in domestic investment (Estimation 1). Using 
the different elements of governance (estimation 2 to 7), their impact on domestic investment 
remain significant. Therefore, an index point increases in regulatory quality, voice and 
accountability, rule of law, corruption control, government effectiveness and political 
stability will lead to increases of about 0.98%, 0.77%, 0.71%, 0.79%, 0.83% and 0.33% in 
domestic investment, respectively. According to Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010)’s 
definition of these elements of governance, the above governance impact indicates that, 
investors’ perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development (regulatory 
quality) and their perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate 
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in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, association and a free media 
(voice and accountability) are more important in the decision to invest in a country. This is 
followed by the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society 
and, in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (rule of law); the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption 
(corruption control); and government effectiveness, which reflects the quality of public and 
civil services and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government's commitment 
to such policies. However, the element of governance with the least impact on domestic 
investment is the political stability. This indicates that investors are more resilient to the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means in their decision to make real investment in a country (Kaufmann et al, 2010).  
All the macroeconomic variables (except for financial development) are found to be 
statistically and economically significant determinants of domestic investment in all the 
equations (table 1). For instance, the results (equation 1) show that a 1% increase in GDP will 
lead to an increase of about 0.8% in the level of domestic investment. This will lead to an 
increase of about 0.18% when financial development is increased by 1%. The economic 
significance of the real interest rate remains small in all the estimations and translates into a 
unit decline in real interest rate is expected to boost the level of domestic investment by about 
0.01% among the selected sub-Saharan African countries. The depreciation of the local 
currencies against the US dollar by 1% will boost domestic investment by about 0.33%.     
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3.2. Policy implications: detecting a "sustainable" level of domestic investment in 
relation to governance ratings 
To boost domestic investment among the developing and low-income countries, this study 
has estimated that a higher and sustained economic growth, a well-developed financial 
system, low cost of capital, an attractive exchange rate and a good governance structure are 
needed simultaneously. Previous studies, highlighted above, have also confirmed these 
results, but none have taken it a step further by identifying a sustainable domestic investment 
that could be useful for policy guidance. In this section the findings generally indicate that 
countries with an initially lower (poor) level of governance tend to operate at lower and 
similar domestic investment levels, even when GDP differs among them –suggesting a 
domestic investment convergence–. Therefore, working towards achieving better governance 
could be the necessary first step to boosting domestic investment.  
The regressions above have clearly shown that increases in output (GDP), financial inclusion, 
low cost of capital and depreciating currency are of importance where the aim is to boost 
domestic investment. At the same time, governance is important where the aim is to increase 
the level of domestic investment; thus, thresholds for domestic investment are derived as a 
function of governance.
v
  
Following the idea in Akanbi (2015), since the governance scores range from −2.5 to +2.5 
and in order to categorise governance at different levels, the range between −2.5 and −1 
corresponds to “poor governance”, between −1 and +0.5 corresponds to “average 
governance”, and between +0.5 and +2.5 corresponds to “good governance”.vi 
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Figure 2: Governance and domestic investment levels 
Panel A Panel B 
  
Panel C  Panel D 
  
Panel E Panel F 
17 
 
 
 
Panel G  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation and analysis of data from Eviews 8 
 
To derive the threshold of domestic investment at a given level of governance rating, 
averages across time and cross-sections for the entire dependent and independent variables 
were taken. These averages are substituted into estimated equations (3) and repeated for the 
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varying governance ratings (from -2.5 to +2.5) and different elements of governance.
vii
 
Therefore, for a given average GDP level ranging from US$7 to US$29 billion (figure 2A–
2G), countries with poor governance ratings will sustain a lower level of domestic 
investment, while those with good governance ratings will be able to sustain a higher 
domestic investment level. 
From figure 2, operating at a higher level of GDP will bring about a higher domestic 
investment level. In relation to domestic investment and the elements of governance in 
figures 2A–2F, there seems to be an existence of convergence in domestic investment as 
governance deteriorates. Irrespective of the level of GDP, domestic investment levels tend to 
converge at their lowest as poor governance are attained. This convergence is most visible in 
relation to regulatory quality rating in figure 2B. For instance, countries at a -0.5 governance 
rating, in figure 2B, will still have similar domestic investment levels, even when GDP levels 
differ. In addition, these trends are very non-resilient to changes in the elements of 
governance presented in figure 2B–2F. Meaning that, a small change in the governance 
ratings will lead to a larger change in domestic investment. With the baseline GDP level 
(figure 2A-2F), the level of domestic investment will rise from US$0.74 billion to US$22.28 
billion as average governance improves within the region. Looking at specific elements of 
governance, the level of domestic investment will rise from US$0.47 billion to US$51.23 
billion, as better regulatory quality is being pursued; from US$0.56 billion to US$33.7 
billion, as voice and accountability improves; from US$0.66 billion to US$30.93 billion, as 
rule of law is being pursued; from US$0.58 billion to US$30.22 billion, as corruption is being 
controlled; from US$0.98 billion to US$16.1 billion, as government effectiveness improves; 
and from US$1.38 billion to US$7.16 billion, as political environment stabilises. This 
indicates that the governance elasticity of domestic investment differs for the six elements of 
governance measures.    
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With the political stability measures there seems to be differing investment levels, even when 
countries are operating at poor governance ratings. This divergence at poor governance 
ratings is attributable to the resilient effects of political stability ratings on domestic 
investment. With regard to domestic investment and political stability, in figure 2G, 
convergence at a lower (poor) ratings could not be achieved; instead domestic investment 
levels seems to differ as GDP differs. This indicates that, to a certain degree, investors could 
overlook political instability in a country and invest more as long as there is evidence of a 
higher level of income (GDP). In this scenario, countries with higher levels of GDP will 
continue to attract more investment, even when they are operating at the same political 
stability rating. Looking at the baseline trend in figures 2G, at the poor governance rating of -
2.5, real domestic investment will stand at about US$1.38 billion, while at a good governance 
rating of +2.5, real domestic investment will stand at about US$7.16 billion. Despite the 
resilience of domestic investment to changes in the political stability rating, attaining a good 
political stability rating of at least +0.5 could still produce, at the very least, an extra US$790 
million real investment in the region.         
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This study has been able to empirically examine the importance of governance in boosting 
the level of domestic investment in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to incorporate all cost-
minimising and profit maximising decision-making processes of the firm, an augmented 
neoclassical (Jorgenson) approach was adopted as the most suitable theoretical framework for 
estimating domestic investment in the region. The analysis was carried out on a panel of 45 
selected sub-Saharan African countries, starting from 1996 to 2013. Due to the endogeneity 
problem that could exist among the regressors, the study resolved to use the TSLS fixed 
effect estimation techniques. The estimations performed (after controlling for other factors) 
portray a robust estimate of the parameters in the domestic investment equations. However, 
better governance structures have again been confirmed to significantly boost the level of 
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domestic investment in these countries. The stylised facts presented show a serious structural 
and institutional bottleneck hindering the decision of investors to make real investment in the 
region. 
The main findings of the study have revealed the following: 
 Other than real output (GDP), financial development, cost of capital, exchange rate, 
and the level of governance are also significant determinants of domestic investment 
within the region. Therefore, positive investment strategies should focus more on 
institutional impediments, but without undermining the macroeconomic factors. 
 The study reveals that establishing a strong institutional framework within an 
economy is the first necessary step to boost domestic investment in the region. This, 
therefore, confirms the argument that governance holds sway over all economic 
objectives.  
 There exists a convergence in domestic investment levels as poor governance (i.e. 
regulatory quality, rule of law, voice & accountability, corruption control and 
government effectiveness) ensued even when GDP levels differ across countries. The 
disappointing historical data of low domestic investment in SSA and other developing 
economies could be eradicated if all economies strive to achieve the best level of 
governance. 
 Convergence in domestic investment does not occur when political stability 
deteriorates, even at differing levels of GDP. To a certain extent, investors are found 
to be resilient to changes in the political stability rating. They could tend to invest 
more, depending on the severity of the instability, in as much as there is an attractive 
market size (higher GDP level) in the country.  
From a policy perspective, to ensure an inclusive growth and development trajectory, 
establishing good governance structures should precede all other objectives. There is a need 
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to continue to strengthened government institutions by improving coordination within 
government structures. To boost domestic investment in the region, government capability to 
be able to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations, which will permit and 
promote private sector development, is urgently needed. There is also the need to establish a 
culture of respect for the rule of law, zero tolerance on corruption and an improvement in the 
ability of governments to provide quality public goods and services for its citizens.     
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Endnotes  
 
                                                          
i
 The governance scores ranges from –2.5 to +2.5, with –2.5 representing the worst governance and +2.5 the best governance. 
ii
 Detailed analysis on how governance is measured is presented in section 2. 
iii
 This technique will also circumvent the outlier detected in the case of South Africa’s better than others levels of domestic 
investment and governance rating (as reported in figure 1) within the region. 
iv
 It should be noted that in the case of a TSLS estimation, the coefficient of variations (R-square) and other diagnostic tests 
presented are no more valid since we can no longer decompose the variation in domestic investment into different independent 
components (Wooldridge 2010, 89–115). 
v
 The computed domestic investment from the estimation results is about US$2.70 billion (based on the mean of the pooled 
sample of all countries). The computed domestic investment is very close to the actual values (US$2.74 billion) from the mean 
of the pooled sample. 
vi
 A similar idea was adopted in Kraay and Nehru (2006) when categorising weak, medium, and strong policy using the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment.  
vii
 The regression results presented in table 1 (estimation 1–7) are used to calculate the thresholds. The thresholds for domestic 
investment are obtained by controlling for average GDP levels, financial development, real interest rate and nominal exchange 
rate (figures 2A–2G). This is based on the mean of the pooled sample of selected SSA countries. In addition, the obtained 
thresholds also controlled for all other unobserved variables in the estimations, which is captured through the error term. 
